Every announcement from — of — routed Danish ASNs is RPKI-valid, while — have no valid route at all. Only — routed ASNs publish ASPA. — high-severity findings need attention first, including — RPKI-invalid route(s).
Daily snapshots: share of routed ASNs whose every route is valid, and share of announced IPv4 and IPv6 space that is RPKI-valid.
Each announcement seen by RIPE RIS was validated against the full global ROA set. All valid: every route validates. Partly valid: some routes are NotFound or Invalid. None valid: nothing protected.
ROA prefixes naming a Danish ASN, by the repository that publishes them. A ROA is published by the certificate authority (CA) of whoever holds the address space, which is not always the network using it (provider-assigned or leased space). With a delegated CA the holder runs the CA itself; if it or its publication server stops working, its ROAs expire and routes lose protection. One ASN can appear under several repositories. Repository counts come from the console’s per-ASN pages, which can lag the validated data by a few hours.
One finding per ASN and issue type. Colour shows severity.
Every ROA prefix (VRP) for Danish ASNs. Anything beyond “exact” permits more-specifics; unannounced ones can be hijacked with a forged origin and still validate (RFC 9319).
Every routed Danish ASN, largest announced IPv4 space (counted in /24s) first. Bars show the share of IPv4 space and of all announcements that validate as RPKI-valid. Click a column to sort.
Everything on this page is computed from these public sources once a day. The times show when the data used in this update was produced. The raw results are linked at the bottom of the page.
Number of changes found by each day's update. Click a day to list its changes below; hover for the counts.
Every change per ASN, day by day: route validity, announcements, ROAs, ASPA records and findings. Green is an improvement, red a regression, grey neutral.
Sorted by severity, then by the size of the network. Route validity uses exact announcements seen by RIPE RIS and the full validated ROA set.
What to do about each kind of issue. Click one to list only those recommendations below.
Every finding turned into a concrete action, ordered by priority and then by network size. “Fix now” routes are being dropped or are open to hijacking today; “Consider” suggests publishing ASPA for routed networks that have none.
Each row is a customer AS and the providers it authorises, next to the neighbours RIPE RIS sees on its upstream side (with how many RIS peers see each link). An unlisted neighbour is harmless if it is a peer; an unlisted transit provider makes routes fail ASPA checks. Listed providers never seen may be backup links or stale entries.
Click a column to sort. Use “All registered ASNs” at the top to include ASNs with no announcement seen by at least 10 RIS peers. Upstream-side neighbours are what an ASPA for that AS would likely need to list.